In a recent interview with Startmag, Ambassador Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata, former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, observed that Kremlin ideologues are framing the war in Ukraine as a conflict that "will only end when one of the two blocs, the continental powers or the maritime powers, gains the upper hand."
This observation is scientifically significant. It effectively operationalizes a key hypothesis of my research on Anglo-American geopolitical theory (Bordonaro 2023): that the current conflict is being explicitly cast as a structural contest between two geopolitical blocs. This vocabulary—"continental" versus "maritime"—maps directly onto the Mackinder–Spykman grammar (Heartland/Continental mass versus Rimland/Maritime coalition). Terzi’s remarks highlight how a classical spatial typology continues to shape threat perception and strategic narrative, not only in Moscow but also within the NATO-aligned policy mindset, driving the conclusion that Europe must strengthen its deterrent capacity within the Atlantic framework.
The Persistence of Western Strategic Perceptions
My research suggests that the Mackinder–Spykman tradition persists within Western strategic discourse less as an explicit canon than as a durable continuity of perceptions. Even when the authors are not cited, this tradition structures how actors interpret spatial threats and opportunities.
It endures because it provides a "theatre grammar" that maps with remarkable precision onto NATO’s core strategic geography. This is most visible along the Rimland interfaces and the Baltic–Black Sea wedge, where enclosed seas, corridors, and chokepoints concentrate escalation risks. Furthermore, it offers a repertoire of narrative templates—the Heartland as a consolidating myth, the cordon sanitaire, and the persistent Atlantic fear of continental consolidation—that can be repurposed across political cycles to mobilize consensus.
The sequence of shocks from 2008 to 2014, culminating in 2022, has effectively re-legitimated assumptions about positional competition and the strategic weight of geography that post–Cold War narratives had prematurely discarded. In the Western strategic literature of the last three decades, this "return" is evident in the ecosystem shaping U.S. security perceptions—influential institutes like RAND and CSIS, and professional military venues. There are clear examples of U.S. military presentations applying Mackinder, Spykman, and Kennan to contemporary China, interpreting the Belt and Road Initiative through Heartland/Rimland logics. This constitutes a direct textual bridge between classical geopolitical thought and modern practitioner perception.
The Eurasian Mirror: Geopolitics as Destiny?
However, this hypothesis extends beyond the West. It is well known that German geopolitical thought, particularly that of Karl Haushofer, absorbed the Anglo-Saxon tradition to counter its strategic implications (“fas est et ab hoste doceri”). Today, this framework remains pertinent for Russian and Eurasian theorists.
Unlike their Western counterparts who may use these concepts implicitly, Eurasian thinkers frequently interpret the Mackinder-Spykman worldview as a cohesive, scientific system. They view it as an objective reflection of the distribution of power—political, military, and cultural. Consequently, from this standpoint, geography dictates an obligatory political stance: a course of action aligned with the "objective interests" of their "continentality."
This phenomenon is critical to monitor. The philosophical underpinnings of such a worldview are conducive to geostrategic and civilizational conflict. It is a deterministic frame often exploited by political elites who need to solidify their domestic camps as they vie for regime survival.
Escaping the Deterministic Trap: The Role of Systemic Geopolitics
Are political elites forced to think in such fashion by objective reality? Hardly.
While the Mackinder–Spykman tradition provides a powerful lens, it risks drifting toward a binary, territorially over-determined map of world politics. To retain the heuristic power of the land–sea dialectic without inheriting its rigid, quasi-mechanical implications, we should look to Saul B. Cohen’s "systemic" geopolitics (Cohen 2015).
Cohen absorbs a core lesson from American political geography (Hartshorne and Whittlesey): regions are not immutable "natural facts" but analytical constructs. Their boundaries depend on chosen criteria and the historically contingent interactions between humans, technology, and space. By adopting this view, we can treat geopolitical categories as finite and revisable rather than absolute, allowing for a strategic analysis that acknowledges the weight of geography without succumbing to the fatalism of the Heartland-Rimland binary.
Why geopolitical thought matters
Ultimately, advancing geopolitical literacy—among both ruling elites and the general public—is essential for navigating the nascent multipolar order. By embracing post-classical theories that offer flexible, analytical spatial frameworks, we can cultivate security perceptions that are realistic and balanced rather than fatalistic. Moving away from rigid binary determinism does more than sharpen our analysis; it creates the necessary intellectual space to revitalize diplomacy. In doing so, we transform geography from a prison of inevitable conflict into a landscape where pragmatic peace efforts can once again find traction.
Bordonaro, F. (2023), La geopolitica anglosassone, 3rd ed., Milan.
Cohen, S.B. (2015), Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 3rd ed., Lanham.
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