Assessing the correctness of a 2008 analytical piece

 Russia and Its "Near Abroad" from El'cin to Putin was an analytical piece written in Italian and published for "Ricerche Storiche" in 2008.  Here below is an English translation of the conclusions. 

Conclusions

In the 1990s, proponents of the "neo-Eurasian" school posited a geopolitical analogy between post-Soviet Russia and its eighteenth-century predecessor: a major regional power harbouring significant ambitions yet confronting substantial rivals for influence within its "Near Abroad," encompassing the territories from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The initial expectation of a robust Russian-American partnership during the 1992-1993 period gave way to disillusionment, fostering a resurgence of nationalism, albeit in varied manifestations.

The Yeltsin era can be characterized as a period in which Russia attempted to reclaim its political-diplomatic, military, and economic centrality within the Near Abroad; however, internal and external constraints that debilitated the Russian state throughout the 1990s impeded Moscow's aspirations. This period also fostered the perception of a Russia more amenable to Western interests in the region. The eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency indisputably witnessed an augmentation of Russian influence within the Near Abroad, with energy leverage serving as the Kremlin's principal instrument for reasserting regional influence. However, other factors also contributed to this resurgence.

First, the United States' engagements in the Middle East and Afghanistan diverted resources and attention from Washington, hindering its ability to sustain the penetration of Russia's Near Abroad initiated during the Clinton administration. Second, the character of post-Soviet regimes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, often exhibiting a hybrid of autocracy and democracy rather than conforming to Western liberal democratic models, has engendered complications in political-diplomatic relations between the West and the Central Asian republics. Finally, as previously noted, Russia's rapprochement with Beijing and Ankara has augmented Moscow's influence across the expansive region stretching from the Black Sea to Kyrgyzstan.

Nevertheless, the legacy of the 1991-2008 period is characterized by a fluid geopolitical landscape. Russia's resurgence of influence has attenuated, but not eradicated, the influence of the U.S.-led Euro-Atlantic bloc. Moreover, Russia's renewed power remains constrained by significant limitations: military, owing to the obsolescence of much of its armed forces; diplomatic, due to the impatience of many Near Abroad states with Moscow's hegemonic ambitions; and economic, stemming from Russia's persistent reliance on the commodities market.

The persistence of geopolitical multipolarity in Eurasia and the Russian Near Abroad is anticipated in the foreseeable future. Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, and Turkey are likely to oscillate between cooperation and competition, contingent upon their respective interests in specific matters. Furthermore, it is plausible that small and medium-sized regional powers, such as Kazakhstan, will maintain their "multi-vector" foreign policy, characterized by the pursuit of strategic military and economic partnerships with Moscow, the West, and increasingly, China. However, it is equally certain that Moscow will persist in its pursuit of hegemony within its Near Abroad.